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So far as Latin America is concerned,' the dominant
economic happening of the 1980s was the debt crisis.
Commercial bank lending came to an abrupt halt
when Mexico was forced by reserve depletion to
declare a temporary moratorium in August 1982.
Without a flow of new bank loans, continued servicing
of debt on the original contractual terms proved
impossible everywhere except Colombia. The attempt
to maintain debt service dictated fiscal deflation,
devaluation, and the diversion of savings from
investment into export surpluses. The result has been
the 'lost decade': a decline in per capita income of
almost 10 per cent (in place of a 40 per cent rise in the
l970s), a one-third fall in gross investment, and true
hyperinflation for the first time anywhere since the
aftermath of World War II.
The original debt strategy was based on a diagnosis of
temporary illiquidity and sought to maintain debt
service while providing partial interest recycling
(euphemistically termed 'new money') so as to limit
the need for peremptory adjustment. The implicit
premise was that little was fundamentally wrong with
the economic model that had produced quite
reasonable growth from the end of World War lito
the early 1980s: once the traditional levers of fiscal and
exchange-rate policy had been re-set appropriately,
Latin America would be able to generate a negative
transfer, which would restore bankers' confidence,
whereupon lending would recommence and growth
could revert to its previous rate.
By 1985 it was obvious that matters were not working
out that way, and so a new plan, the 'Baker Plan' was
introduced. This contained no significant change in
the financing provisions for debtor countries: they
were still expected to pay interest service in full while
principal was rescheduled and involuntary 'new
money packages' provided partial interest recycling.
What was new was the change in rhetoric, which now
spoke of restoring growth, and the conditionality,
which began to focus on supply-side policies like
deregulation and privatisation. It was not evident to
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while debt is an important problem in other parts of the world
too (notably in Africa. the Philippines, and part of Eastern
Europe), this paper is restricted to Latin America.
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me at the time (and I have no idea whether it was clear
to the plan's authors), but in retrospect one can see the
Baker Plan as challenging the traditional statist model
of Latin American development. Policy reform had to
go far deeper than raising taxes and restoring a
realistic exchange rate.
Just over ,three years later, in early 1989, a new
administration conceded that the Baker Plan had not
worked. Its successor, the Brady Plan, changed the
financing part of the strategy, to encompass debt relief
(which again had to be described euphemistically to
make it acceptable to bankers' ears, as 'debt reduction
and debt service reduction'). The condition for debt
relief remained policy reform on the lines developed
under the Baker Plan, the logic being that policy
reform needed financial support to succeed, while
financial support without policy reform amounted to
throwing good money after bad.
The key question is, of course, whether the Brady Plan
is going to work - in the sense of alllowing the debtor
countries to resume robust growth - where its
predecessors failed. It is already clear that it is unlikely
to make a dramatic difference to the amount of debt
service that debtors will need to pay to avoid
confrontation with their creditors. In the outline
agreement reached with its creditors, Mexico seems to
have gained relief (i.e. a reduction in the present value
of its contractual future obligations) of about one-
third of its bank debt. But a substantial part of this
relief will arise only as the debt is paid off in the distant
future, and Mexico's negative transfer to the banks
will decline by less than 20 per cent in the short run.
The Philippines, the second country to settle, expects
to get even less relief. Costa Rica, the third country to
reach agreement, should get debt relief of about two-
thirds as compared to its contractual obligations, but
this will actually bring it no easing to its cash flow at all
in the short run: indeed, the restructuring will require
some increase in the negative transfer in the medium
run (assuming that the economy continues to perform
well, so that the contingent payments obligations are
activated). Hence, if one believes that the debt
problem has damaged the debtors primarily by
siphoning away funds that would otherwise have been
invested productively at home, one has little reason to
be optimistic about the prospects of the Brady Plan.
The alternative view is that debt is important primarily
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because it is thwarting the entrepreneurial response
that policy reform is intended to elicit. Mexico, for
example, has undertaken an impressive range of policy
reforms during the 1980s, in terms of curbing its fiscal
deficit, achieving a competitive exchange rate (and
hence a rapid growth of nontraditional exports),
liberalising trade and foreign direct investment,
privatising and in other ways rationalising the public
sector, and deregulating [Williamson 1990]. Yet per
capita income and real wages have, at least until
receñtly, continued to fall. Mexican entrepreneurs
have quite enough flight capital parked abroad to
finance an investment boom, once they are convinced
that Mexico has indeed turned the corner and that the
policy reforms are going to stick. Catch-22 is that they
will not draw that conclusion until either they see that
other entrepreneurs have already drawn that con-
clusion or until they conclude that Mexico can get by
in the medium run even without capital repatriation.
In other words in order to succeed, the Brady Plan
needed to provide enough debt relief to give assurance
that repatriation of flight capital was unnecessary,
whereupon repatriation could happen.
In fact, announcement of the agreement between
Mexico and the banks last July stimulated enough
capital repatriation to allow the authorities to reduce
the domestic interest rate by over 20 percentage points,
which would have given them the chance to redirect
something like 5 per cent of GDP from internal debt
service to restoring some of the public expenditures
that have been savagely squeezed in recent years
(including infrastructure, health, and education). This
was the best news since the debt crisis started. It is a
tragedy that subsequent foot-dragging by the banks
has jeopardised the momentum that seemed, to be
building up, and sent interest rates in Mexico inching
up again. At this stage one just has to hope that final
agreement will soon be reached and that it will turn
out that the damage is reversible.
The case of Costa Rica is even clearer, inasmuch as the
agreement offers Costa Rica no cash flow relief at all.
It cuts contractual obligations to the level that Costa
Rica can afford to pay, which is the same as the level
that it has been paying. The hope is that this will
remove the threat of future disruption and so restore
confidence.
Mexico and Costa Rica are not the only countries in
Latin America that have implemented policy reforms
sweeping enough to merit support through the Brady
Plan. Bolivia and Chile have, in fact, gone even further
in modernising their economic model. Colombia,
Jamaica and Uruguay are also serious candidates.
Venezuela too has made major reforms, though it
started only a year ago. Policy reform is even more
recent in Argentina, and its success can even less be
taken for granted. But the best way to help policy
reform there, as well as in countries that have not yet
started, is to show that agreed debt restructurings that
offer debt relief are available to countries that persist
with policy reform. Limiting debt relief to those
countries with an established record of policy reform
is one key element of the Brady Plan that makes good
sense.
Another key feature of the Brady Plan, which arises
from its historical background as an attempt to buy
debt relief from the banks on a voluntary basis, is its
retention of an important element of choice for each
bank, notably a choice between furnishing debt relief
and continuing to recycle a part of the interest (e.g. by
knew money'). One can argue that it might have been
better to develop sanctions to force banks to fall in line
with official decisions on the magnitude of debt relief
that a country needs. If the Brady Plan fails, that issue
will doubtless be reopened in another two or three
years time. But in the interim it is vastly more
constructive to ask what changes might help the Brady
Plan to succeed.
The simplest change would be to enlarge the sums
available from the IMF and World Bank to support
debt relief operations, but this also appears to be a
lost, or at least an unpromising, cause. Three
alternative, evolutionary changes look more hopeful.
(I) At the moment only the commercial banks are
being asked to provide debt relief. There are good
reasons for continuing to exempt the multilateral
development banks. But a lot of debt is also owed to
export credit agencies of the developed countries, and
there is no very convincing reason as to why this
should be treated more leniently than the bank debt.
The simplest approach would be to forgive the same
proportion of this debt as banks choosing debt
reduction are required to forgive. Alternatively, a
similar proportion of the debt could be converted into
local currency terms, to be spent in future years on
projects in the environmental, educational or social
fields agreed to be of mutual interest to creditor and
debtor.
At present the IMF and World Bank are
earmarking separate funds for debt reduction
(buybacks or principal collateralisation) and for
interest support (interest collateralisation). Like most
earmarking, this is leading to inefficiency: most
immediately, the Philippines is being thwarted in its
desire to use the full funds that it has been voted in the
way that seems mutually most advantageous to it and
its creditors, which happens to be buybacks. This
earmarking should be quietly abandoned forthwith.
There is still a problem of getting potential free-
riding banks to participate in Brady-style debt
restructurings. The most potent incentive to a bank to
participate is eligibility for tax relief. At present
European banks are generally eligible for tax relief on
provisions whether or not these are used to grant relief
to the debtor, while American banks get tax relief only
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when debt relief is granted. The European practice
encourages provisioning but gives no incentive to
translate this into debt relief, while the American
practice gives no incentive to provision and therefore
leaves banks in a less favourable position to grant debt
relief. Stephany Griffith-Jones (1989) suggests getting
the best of both worlds by granting contingent tax
relief on provisions, the relief being withdrawn
retroactively if a bank fails to participate in an agreed
debt restructuring.
Those of us who have concluded that profound policy
reforms were needed to change the traditional Latin
model of development can take heart from the reform
movement sweeping Latin America. But well-
intentioned reform programmes often come to nought
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unless they can show some clear results fairly early.
The sort of definitive resolution of the festering debt
crisis offered by a Brady-style restructuring buttressed
by the three suggestions advanced above appears
precisely the sort of result that is needed to encourage
reformers to persist.
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